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A COGNITIVE THEORY OF THE THIRD-PARTY 
DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL PAPERS 
H. Brian Holland* 
ABSTRACT 
For nearly 200 years, an individual’s personal papers enjoyed near-absolute 
protection from government search and seizure. That is no longer the case. With 
the widespread adoption of cloud-based information processing and storage 
services, the third-party doctrine operates to effectively strip our digital papers of 
meaningful Fourth Amendment protections. 
This Article presents a new approach to reconciling current third-party 
doctrine with the technological realities of modern personal information 
processing. Our most sensitive data is now processed and stored on cloud-
computing systems owned and operated by third parties. Although we may 
consider these services to be private and generally secure, the law does not 
currently require the government to obtain a warrant to access our stored 
information. The third-party doctrine creates a sweeping exception to the warrant 
requirement for any information exposed to a third party—even where that third 
party is an automated computing system rather than a human. As a result, our 
personal papers now receive no more protection than any other piece of potential 
evidence. In practical terms, they receive less. This ahistorical approach 
undermines the essential balance between an individual’s interest in privacy and 
the public’s interest in law enforcement. Many have identified and tried to rectify 
the privacy problems created by the shift to third-party cloud-computing systems, 
but it has proven difficult to articulate a limitation to the third-party doctrine that is 
both consistent with existing principles and feasible in practice. 
This Article begins with the intimate connection among freedom of thought, 
privacy of thought, and the longstanding enumeration of “papers” as a distinct 
object of Fourth Amendment protection. This historical understanding of the 
relationship between human thought and private papers, which prior generations 
recognized intuitively, now finds strong support in contemporary cognitive 
science. Modern models of human cognition reveal how papers serve as cognitive 
artifacts performing cognitive tasks. These models furnish a set of proxy 
characteristics for reliably singling out those personal papers whose protection 
would most likely serve constitutional values. The result is a coherent and 
workable method for bringing needed discipline to the third-party doctrine and 
restoring equilibrium to information privacy. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Sincere thanks to Malinda L. 
Seymore, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, and Kymberlie Welp, and to the participants in the Internet Law 
Works-in-Progress conference, Intellectual Property Works-in-Progress conference, and University of 
Oklahoma College of Law faculty exchange program for the many helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost two centuries, an individual’s personal papers enjoyed near-
absolute constitutional protection from governmental search and seizure, even 
against an otherwise valid warrant.1 In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
however, these constitutional bulwarks quickly fell away,2 leaving personal 
papers “no more likely to be excluded from evidence than [almost] any other 
item.”3 For several decades, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
nevertheless worked as a fairly effective safeguard of personal papers.4 Although 
 
 1. See Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 553, 568 (2016) [hereinafter Donohue, Digital World] (“For nearly two hundred years, the 
government could not obtain private papers—even with a warrant—when they were to be used as 
evidence of criminal activity.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (describing the 
broad protection for personal papers provided by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 2. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (finding no violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination where the target of a search warrant was not 
required to prepare, produce, or authenticate personal papers); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309–
310 (1967) (eliminating the Fourth Amendment mere evidence rule as a basis for heightened 
protection for personal papers). 
 3. Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
461, 473 (1981); see Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private 
“Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50–51 (2013) 
(describing the shift from “extraordinary exemption” to mere effects); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The 
“Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 597–98 (2017) (noting that personal papers 
are much less protected by the Fourth Amendment in modern times than they once were). 
 4. The “warrant requirement” refers to the following standard: “Where a search is undertaken 
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that 
reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 
A warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that contraband or 
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no longer afforded exceptional protection, under most circumstances personal 
papers maintained a sort of derivative protection as material objects physically 
located within well-established “constitutionally protected area[s].”5 
The notion of real property as a constitutionally protected area had 
essentially survived the transition from the property-and-trespass approach of 
Olmstead v. United States6 to the expectation-of-privacy test adopted following 
Katz v. United States.7 Likewise, the Court consistently recognized an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy as to certain containers located 
within those physical spaces, such as office furniture8 and desktop computers,9 
where personal papers were likely to be stored. Even those personal papers 
sealed in an envelope and entrusted to the post office for conveyance, and thus 
outside the direct control of the sender, could not be searched without a valid 
warrant, “as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own 
household.”10 Thus, in an analog world of tangible documents—filed away in 
cabinets and computers, stored in homes and offices, and conveyed through first-
class mail—most personal papers remained, as a practical matter, secure behind 
at least two layers of constitutional protection. 
It was not long, however, before this relative stability was undermined by a 
radical transformation of the information environment, marked by the 
emergence of ubiquitous networked computing, digital data, electronic 
communications, and the commodification of information.11 A vast array of 
common activities that were previously undertaken offline are now completed 
 
evidence of a crime will be found. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)) (noting the Supreme Court’s long-standing jurisprudence linking a 
Fourth Amendment “search” to physical intrusion “on a constitutionally protected area”). 
 6. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the wiretapping of conversations is not a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which requires actual physical examination of one’s person, 
papers, tangible material effects, or home), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), 
and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 7. 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining a Fourth Amendment search by 
reference to an intrusion into an individual’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy”). 
 8. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (citing various cases) (finding that 
even public employees have, in certain circumstances, “a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in 
[their] desk[s] and file cabinets”). 
 9. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the 
Use of Virtual Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 1229, 1240 (2012) (describing the traditional search of a computer as 
involving two entries, “one into the home or office, the other into the computer”); Orin S. Kerr, 
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 549 (2005) (“[T]he starting point for 
applying the Fourth Amendment to a computer hard drive is clear and generally uncontroversial: the 
Fourth Amendment applies to computer storage devices just as it does to any other private 
property.”). 
 10. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878). 
 11. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-293, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3, 10 (1985), http://ota.fas.org/
reports/8509.pdf [perma.cc/4KU2-P2EL] (“The existing statutory framework and judicial 
interpretations thereof do not adequately cover new and emerging electronic surveillance 
technologies.”). 
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online, as we use the internet for communication, transactions, storage, and 
more.12 These online activities generate enormous amounts of associated data,13 
as “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in 
the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”14 Much of that data is processed and 
stored by third-party intermediaries and online service providers in the regular 
course of business.15 Conveyance to and retention of a user’s data by the third-
party provider is no longer a byproduct of the commercial transaction between 
user and provider, but is rather at the operational core of the service 
infrastructure.16 Intermediaries collect and use data “in order to route 
communications, detect spam and viruses, block computer hackers, or generate 
advertising revenue.”17 Online service providers retain “[e]-mails, web-surfing 
histories, cloud computing documents, search terms, and credit-card 
information.”18 It is an infrastructure designed not to conceal and control 
information but to expose that data as routine practice. 
Given the vast quantity and expansive character of the data now held by 
third-party providers, the absence of appropriate statutory and constitutional 
protections threatens to undermine societal expectations for information privacy. 
Indeed, there is an emerging consensus that rapidly evolving computer and 
information technologies are outpacing the ability of our legal system to adapt to 
the realities of digital data, networked infrastructure, changing human behavior, 
and user expectations.19 And with each advancement, that lag is compounded at 
an exponential rate. 
How then should the law be revised to return equilibrium to information 
privacy? Prior proposals have generally proceeded along one of two routes: 
legislation modifying the Stored Communications Act20 or reform of the Fourth 
Amendment’s third-party doctrine. In regard to the latter, proposals to modify 
the doctrine can be difficult to formulate in part because its underlying rationale 
 
 12. See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 985, 986 (2016); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 581, 585 (2011) [hereinafter Tokson, Automation]. 
 13. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 588. 
 14. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Ahmed Shawish & Maria Salama, Cloud Computing: Paradigms and Technologies, 
in INTER-COOPERATIVE COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 39, 48–52 
(Fatos Xhafa & Nik Bessis eds.) (Studies in Computational Intelligence Vol. 495, 2014) (describing the 
various models of third-party cloud services and the centrality of user data in each). 
 17. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 602. 
 18. Id. at 588 (“These trillions of bytes of information can often be linked to the IP address and 
then the name and home address of the individual user.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2013) [hereinafter Bedi, Facebook] (reviewing various 
criticisms of the Fourth Amendment and third-party doctrine); Christina Raquel, Blue Skies Ahead: 
Clearing the Air for Information Privacy in the Cloud, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467, 468 (2015) 
(describing the Stored Communications Act as “[o]utdated and disjointed nearly three decades later”). 
 20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018) (providing a statutory framework for the disclosure of 
“stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records” held by third-party internet 
service providers). 
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remains unclear.21 At various times, courts have described the exposure of 
information to a third party as negating an individual’s expectation of privacy, as 
signifying voluntary consent to disclosure of that information by the third party, 
as assuming the risk that the information will simply find its way to government 
officials in one way or another, or as some combination of these theories.22 Most 
reform proposals attack the validity of one or more of these justifications, often 
in the context of technological change.23 Critics have argued, for instance, that 
the rule no longer reflects society’s expectations, or that disclosing data online is 
no longer voluntary,24 or that application of the third-party doctrine to certain 
forms of communication violates constitutional protections for interpersonal 
relationships.25 Others have argued that user interactions with automated 
systems, where human observation is possible but unlikely, should not trigger the 
rule at all.26 This represents only a partial accounting of the numerous proposals, 
which vary not only in concept but also in ambition. Some critics seek to 
eliminate the rule in its entirety, while others call only for modifications that 
might more equitably balance individual privacy interests against the interests of 
society and law enforcement.27 It has proven difficult, however, to articulate both 
an animating rationale and limiting principles that fit comfortably within existing 
privacy doctrine and are workable in practice.28 
 
 21. See, e.g., Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19, at 11–14 (discussing various theories asserted to 
justify the third-party doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 563–64 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine] (same). 
 22. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing the various 
theories); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (assumption of risk); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (voluntariness and assumption of risk). 
 23. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, 
Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2016) (arguing that “in an IP-
based communications environment, the concept of voluntary conveyance . . . is, at best, a legal 
fiction”); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party 
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 984–86 (2007) (arguing that 
individuals may retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information shared with a third party); 
Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical 
Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 482, 511–16 (2012) (presenting survey data purporting to “refute the 
assumption of risk rationale”); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 199 (2011) (challenging the notion of the third-party doctrine as a doctrine of consent). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” in the digital age (first 
citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; then citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443)). 
 25. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth 
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011) (arguing that the current 
“aggressive form of third party doctrine” applied to online activities and communications does not 
reflect society’s expectations of privacy); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139 (2016) (describing how the concept of knowing and voluntary 
disclosure is undermined by many technologies that society considers essential to daily living and that 
integrate the disclosure of information to third parties). 
 26. See generally Tokson, Automation, supra note 12 (arguing that the “courts’ conflation of 
disclosure to automated systems with disclosure to human beings threatens online privacy”). 
 27. See, e.g., Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19, at 17–18 (reviewing various proposed remedies). 
 28. See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine 
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This Article takes a different path. Accepting Justice Scalia’s implicit 
invitation in United States v. Jones29 to revisit the core enumerated objects of 
Fourth Amendment protection30—“persons, houses, papers, and effects”31—I 
explore the functional import of “papers” in the maintenance of personal 
privacy. For most of U.S. history, the significance of papers as a constitutionally 
protected area remained practically obscured by other, more expansive privacy 
doctrines like papers as property, shielded by the “mere evidence” rule;32 papers 
as conveyed confidential messages entrusted to the U.S. mail;33 and papers as 
effects, secured within private premises or closed containers.34 Even as personal 
papers moved from the analog form to digitized files, the privacy analysis 
proceeded by analogy along these same lines: emails to letters, computers to file 
cabinets, and so on.35 But as information technologies continue to evolve, placing 
“digital papers” beyond these traditional boundaries of what is private and what 
is public, we must consider Fourth Amendment protections for papers qua 
papers, apart from this protective overlay. 
In this Article, I argue that the enumeration of papers as a discrete area of 
Fourth Amendment protection—distinct from trespass upon real and personal 
property (i.e., houses and effects) and bodily integrity (i.e., persons)—reflects a 
unique and substantial concern for the historical sanctity of “an individual’s most 
private thoughts.”36 
 
of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 42 n.47 (2011) (providing an extensive 
overview of various and diverse approaches to reforming the third-party doctrine). 
 29. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 30. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 (holding that Katz supplemented, rather than replaced, 
traditional concerns about government trespass upon the four enumerated objects of Fourth 
Amendment protection). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 32. See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1308–14 
(2016) [hereinafter Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment] (discussing the history of the “mere 
evidence” rule). The “mere evidence rule” refers to the “former doctrine that a search warrant allows 
seizure of the instrumentalities of the crime (such as a murder weapon) or the fruits of the crime (such 
as stolen goods), but does not permit the seizure of items that have evidentiary value only (such as 
incriminating documents).” Mere-Evidence Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967) (explaining and rejecting the rule). 
 33. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1307 n.728 (quoting THOMAS 
M. COOLEY & VICTOR H. LANE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 432 n.2 (7th ed. 1903)). 
 34. See Donohue, Digital World, supra note 1, at 678–79. 
 35. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2230 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing “letters held by mail carrier” and “e-mails held by Internet service provider” as 
limitations on the third-party doctrine (first citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); then citing 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010))); Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–88 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (discussing the analogy of email to letters and phone calls); United States v. Forrester, 512 
F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (calling the “surveillance of e-mail addresses . . . conceptually 
indistinguishable from” that of physical mail); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“Courts have not hesitated to apply established Fourth Amendment principles to computers and 
computer files, often drawing analogies between computers and physical storage units such as file 
cabinets and closed containers.” (citing various cases)). 
 36. Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 890 
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Freedom of thought has been “recognized for centuries as perhaps the most 
vital of our liberties”37 and “the central liberty in our constitutional system.”38 In 
the words of Justice Cardozo, “freedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”39 But although 
“[t]he freedom of individuals to control their own thoughts has been repeatedly 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court,”40 the precise foundations and substance 
of that freedom remain somewhat uncertain.41 
Freedom of thought has been primarily connected to First Amendment 
protections for speech, association, assembly, and the exercise of one’s religious 
beliefs.42 In this regard, the more inward freedom of thought holds only 
instrumental value (i.e., “value as a means to some other valuable end”),43 with 
freedom of thought valued “as a way of promoting” these outwardly expressive 
liberties.44 In addition, the “Court has also recognized the intersection of 
freedom of the mind, protected by the First Amendment, with the right to 
privacy.”45 As one scholar observed, “[t]he ‘right of privacy’ is more than a 
physical dwelling, . . . it is the ‘privacy of thought.’”46 Indeed, it has been argued 
that the “right of privacy [is] derive[d] from this respect for the individual mind 
in both its intellectual and its lurid workings.”47 
As the Constitution’s central privacy provision, the Fourth Amendment 
reflects this relationship, preserving a protected sphere of respite and seclusion 
 
(1985); see also Dripps, supra note 3, at 67–68 (describing concerns expressed in the early English cases 
that the seizure of personal papers exposed a man’s secret thoughts). 
 37. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388–89 (2008) [hereinafter 
Richards, Intellectual Privacy]. 
 38. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement 
and the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1049 [hereinafter Blitz, Freedom of Thought]. 
 39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
 40. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 776 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 41. See, e.g., Blitz, Freedom of Thought, supra note 38, at 1051 (“[A]s central as freedom of 
thought is to our constitutional system, it is also something of a mystery: the Supreme Court has never 
said exactly what this freedom is.”); Adam J. Kolber, Two Views of First Amendment Thought Privacy, 
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1383 (2016) (“Many free speech cases trumpet our freedom of thought but 
say frustratingly little about the contours of the protection.”). 
 42. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Where and Why of Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 15, 15 (2009) [hereinafter Blitz, Intellectual Privacy] (“Freedom of thought has long been a 
celebrated part of First Amendment jurisprudence.”). But see Kolber, supra note 41, at 1385 
(“Constitutional protection of thought may emerge not only from the First Amendment, but also from 
the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 43. Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value or 
Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 879 (2007) (comparing instrumental value to intrinsic value). 
 44. See Kolber, supra note 41, at 1386–87. 
 45. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 777. 
 46. Claudia Tuchman, Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2267, 2280 (1994) (omission in original) (quoting Brief for Joel Hirschhorn, Esq., et al., on 
behalf of The First Amendment Lawyers’ Ass’n, as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20, 
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (No. 70-2), 1972 WL 
136206). 
 47. Id. at 2282. 
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as the “sanctuary where private reflections and inspirations may be created or 
recorded without fear.”48 As Justice Brandeis famously wrote in Olmstead: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . recognized the significance of 
man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect . . . . They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, 
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of 
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.49 
Thus, just as freedom of thought holds instrumental value as a means of 
promoting outwardly expressive liberties, privacy of thought holds instrumental 
value as a means of promoting freedom of thought by preserving a protected 
sphere for the workings of the mind. 
The history of the Fourth Amendment reflects this conspicuous connection, 
not only between freedom of thought and the right to privacy but to the 
enumeration of papers as a distinct area of protection. English cases and 
parliamentary debates of the late eighteenth century condemned the use of 
general warrants to search a man’s papers, not simply because papers are a form 
of property but because papers reveal “the private workings of a person’s 
mind.”50 In the United States, early state constitutions reflected this view as well, 
distinguishing textually (as does the Fourth Amendment) between papers and 
other forms of property.51 And the Supreme Court, in one of its earliest privacy 
decisions, embraced the influence of English law on the structure and 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by, inter alia, acknowledging and 
adopting a special concern for invasions upon personal papers.52 But these 
eighteenth-century decisions proved to be the “high-water mark” for the special 
status of papers.53 Over the past century, broad rules based on binary distinctions 
(e.g., seclusion versus trespass, private versus public, and concealment versus 
disclosure) have subsumed this unique concern for personal papers almost to the 
point of vanishing.54 The unique connection between personal papers and 
 
 48. Comment, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The 
Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 699 (1982). 
 49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 50. Dripps, supra note 3, at 66–67. 
 51. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1264–80 (discussing the various 
state provisions). 
 52. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (“The search for and seizure of stolen or 
forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally 
different things from a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of 
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him.”). 
 53. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 597. 
 54. See Colleen Maher Ernst, Note, Looking Back To Look Forward: Reexamining the 
Application of the Third-Party Doctrine to Conveyed Papers, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 334–42 
(2014) (discussing the foundation of applying the third-party doctrine to private papers). 
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freedom of thought has been all but lost in the muddle of shifting Fourth 
Amendment theory and jurisprudence. 
The goal of this Article is to offer a rationale for restoring the special status 
of papers by reestablishing their connection to and necessity for freedom of 
thought. More specifically, I argue that the significance of papers as a 
constitutionally protected area under the Fourth Amendment is in the function 
of papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive artifacts—objects or devices so 
broadly “incorporated into the very mechanisms of . . . human thought” as to 
demand privacy protection as a necessary condition to freedom of thought.55 As 
part of a functionally integrated cognitive system, cognitive artifacts “represent, 
store, retrieve and manipulate information.”56 In practice, cognitive artifacts and 
technologies are quite familiar—from language and writing to computing and the 
internet.57 And most of us can appreciate that these devices alter our thought 
processes by mediating our experiences and allowing us to offload various 
cognitive tasks. Although more modern technologies may illuminate our growing 
reliance on papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive artifacts, our reliance 
on cognitive artifacts is hardly a new phenomenon. For centuries, we have stored 
our personal memories in diaries, relied on books for facts about the larger 
world, and facilitated our relationships through handwritten letters.58 The idea of 
papers as cognitive artifacts—as essential components of human cognitive 
processes—is entirely consistent with the experience of those who drafted and 
ratified the U.S. Constitution. 
If we acknowledge our constitutional commitment to freedom of thought, 
then we must likewise recognize the need to safeguard the cognitive mechanisms 
that are necessary to effectuate that freedom. Those who gave birth to the 
Fourth Amendment understood this and expressly provided for such protections 
by securing “papers” against unreasonable search and seizure.59 In the present 
information environment, however, where cognitive artifacts are no longer 
concealed within physical space but are instead distributed across third-party 
cloud-computing networks, existing jurisprudence fails this obligation.60 This 
Article offers a proposal for restoring exceptional Fourth Amendment 
protections to papers and their digital equivalents by reforming current doctrine 
to meet the challenges of modern technologies. 
 
 55. Harry Collins, Andy Clark & Jeff Shrager, Keeping the Collectivity in Mind?, 7 
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 353, 361 (2008) (Clark’s “The Blind Carpenter: A Reply to 
Harry Collins”). 
 56. Philip Brey, The Epistemology and Ontology of Human-Computer Interaction, 15 MINDS & 
MACHINES 383, 385 (2005) [hereinafter Brey, Human-Computer Interaction]. 
 57. See Edwin Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts [hereinafter Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts] 
(discussing various examples of cognitive artifacts), in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCES 126, 126–27 (R.A. Wilson & F.C. Kell eds., 2001). 
 58. See generally Donald A. Norman, Cognitive Artifacts, in DESIGNING INTERACTION: 
PSYCHOLOGY AT THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERFACE 17 (1991). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 60. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles 
to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2218 (2009). 
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The Article proceeds in three sections. In Section I, I outline the relevant 
legal landscape, tracing the evolution of modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and the emergence of the third-party doctrine. In Section II, I 
describe the profound transformation of the digital age, focusing on digitized 
electronic communication and cloud computing. I then explore application of the 
third-party doctrine in an online environment where personal information is 
exposed to third-party intermediaries and online service providers as a matter of 
course. I conclude that, in practical application, the third-party doctrine creates 
an exception to the warrant requirement that all but swallows the general rule 
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. 
In Section III, I propose exempting a relatively narrow class of digital 
papers from the third-party doctrine, thereby requiring the government to secure 
a Fourth Amendment warrant prior to a search or seizure of those documents 
from a third-party intermediary or online service provider. My proposal is 
constructed in three steps. In step one, I describe the relationship between 
freedom of thought as a constitutional commitment and privacy of thought as an 
essential condition for its realization. I then argue that freedom of thought and 
privacy of thought were historically connected to the enumeration of papers as a 
distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection. In step two, I seek to revive 
this connection by offering a new perspective on the role of personal papers in 
the processes of thought. I begin by introducing various models of human 
cognition and then explain how personal papers may be conceptualized as 
cognitive artifacts functioning as components of these systems. This account is 
consistent, I argue, with the intuition of prior generations that personal papers 
are deserving of extraordinary protection. In step three, I propose changes to the 
third-party doctrine intended to reestablish enhanced constitutional safeguards 
for certain personal papers. Integrating historical insight with modern cognitive 
theory, I set forth a method by which to identify a subset of personal papers, the 
protection of which is most likely to serve our commitment to freedom of 
thought. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been described 
as “an incoherent mess.”61 The third-party doctrine has been called “the Fourth 
Amendment rule scholars love to hate.”62 But how did we reach this wretched 
state? 
 
 61. Nicholas Kahn-Fogel, An Examination of the Coherence of Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 276, 278–92 (2016) (providing an extensive review 
of scholarship making this general argument). 
 62. Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 563; see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[C]ountless scholars . . . have come to conclude that 
the ‘third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly wrong.’” (quoting Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, 
supra note 21, at 564 (footnotes omitted))). 
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A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause.”63 The Supreme Court has traditionally read the 
Amendment’s substantive reasonableness clause and procedural warrant clause 
as interrelated, such that warrantless searches are said to be presumptively or 
even per se unreasonable.64 In practice, however, the warrant requirement often 
offers little resistance.65 Indeed, far from settling the question, the absence of a 
warrant merely reframes the inquiry. First, the lack of a warrant may be 
overcome by a showing that no search or seizure took place and therefore no 
warrant was required.66 Second, even where a search has occurred, the 
government’s actions may be excused under one of the numerous exceptions to 
the warrant requirement developed by the Court.67 Finally, any surviving 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may be neutralized by failing to apply the 
exclusionary rule.68 
It is this first question—whether a search has taken place—that dominates 
much of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Prior to 1967, a Fourth 
Amendment search was defined as a “physical intrusion [into] a constitutionally 
protected area in order to obtain information.”69 In applying this standard, a 
protected area was defined by an individual’s property ownership or possessory 
rights in the object or location of the search.70 And a physical intrusion was 
defined by reference to common law trespass.71 The Court formally abandoned 
 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 64. See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the 
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 541–43 (1997) 
(discussing the relationship between Fourth Amendment warrants and reasonableness, and the 
Supreme Court’s asserted preference for the traditional warrant requirement); see also Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2221 (“[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable . . . [unless they] fall[] within a 
specific exception to the warrant requirement.” (citation omitted)). 
 65. Brent E. Newton, The Real-World Fourth Amendment, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 759, 766 
(2016) (“[I]n the vast majority of situations, a search warrant or an arrest warrant is not required for a 
‘reasonable’ search or seizure to occur.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether 
or not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”). 
 67. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) (5th ed. 2017). There are six major exceptions to the warrant requirement (i.e., 
circumstances under which the government is permitted to conduct a search without first obtaining a 
warrant). Id. These exceptions include search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view exception, 
consent, stop and frisk, the automobile exception, and emergencies or hot pursuit. Id. 
 68. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.1 (5th ed. 2017). The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained in violation 
of an individual’s constitutional rights be excluded from evidence at trial. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–512 (1961)). 
 70. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s 
“close connection to property”). 
 71. See id. at 405 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, 
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this property-and-trespass approach in Katz.72 Observing that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,”73 the Court rejected formal, property-
based limitations on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections,74 focusing 
instead on whether government agents had violated the individual’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”75 Under this formulation, a Fourth Amendment search 
requires “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”76 The Katz standard has governed 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for nearly five decades and remains the 
dominant standard for determining whether a search has taken place.77 
In application, however, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been unable 
to shed the binary distinctions of the pre-Katz era, such that privacy tends to be 
conceptualized as “a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”78 
Although couched as a contextual analysis, the Katz standard remains 
persistently bound to physical seclusion and concealment. What is reasonable 
“under the circumstances”79 is nearly always to maintain absolute obscurity, 
from both the government and the public generally. As applied to tangible 
objects in the terrestrial domain, seclusion is correlated with the right to exclude 
and thus remains centralized around property rights and physical intrusion.80 But 
 
at least until the latter half of the 20th century.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))); 
Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1244–46 (2012) (observing that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is grounded in property concepts); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2213–14 (2018) (referencing the historical connection between Fourth Amendment protections 
and trespass upon property). 
 72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). 
 73. Id. at 351. 
 74. Id. at 350–51. 
 75. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (discussing the 
Katz approach). 
 76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 77. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (discussing the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard). 
 78. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967)). 
 80. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of 
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts 
of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. 
One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or 
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by 
virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, 
need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an 
interest. These ideas were rejected both in Jones and Katz. But by focusing on legitimate expectations 
of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of 
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that 
Amendment.” (citations omitted)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984). In 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the majority opinion and each of the four dissenting 
opinions reaffirmed the connection between Fourth Amendment protections and trespass-upon-
property. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14; id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Katz did not 
abandon reliance on property-based concepts.”); id. at 2235–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
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even here, mere seclusion is not always sufficient. In certain circumstances, 
physical trespass across property lines is permitted without triggering a Fourth 
Amendment search, even where the property owner has taken significant efforts 
to deter others from accessing the area.81 Likewise, many invasive technologies 
that permit the government to gain information from secluded areas beyond the 
property line do not constitute a trespass or intrusion at all.82 
The failure of seclusion, whether by property interest or physical barriers, 
places far greater pressure on concealment to secure one’s privacy interest. The 
Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in California v. Ciraolo83 demonstrates this point. 
Ciraolo maintained a marijuana garden in his yard, closely adjacent to his 
home.84 His yard was completely enclosed by a six-foot outer fence, and the 
marijuana garden itself was enclosed within a second, ten-foot inner fence.85 As a 
result, the garden was entirely obscured from ground-level observation.86 
Undeterred, local police “secured a private plane and flew over [Ciraolo’s] house 
at an altitude of 1,000 feet,”87 from which they observed and photographed the 
marijuana plants growing below.88 The Court held that no search had occurred in 
this case because Ciraolo’s clear subjective expectation of privacy, evidenced by 
seclusion of the marijuana behind multiple tall fences,89 was not one that society 
was willing to recognize as legitimate.90 Although cast as a test of contextual 
reasonableness, this conclusion is grounded firstly in bright-line distinctions 
between concealment and disclosure. 
As the Court observed in Katz, “[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”91 Public exposure is in turn defined not by reference to active 
 
Katz in favor of a property-based approach); id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), as turning on the 
defendants’ lack of property rights in the property of another); id. at 2267–71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that a return to property concepts might resolve difficulties arising in regards to the third-
party doctrine). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (holding that erecting multiple 
ranch style fences across an open field does not create an expectation of privacy); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (holding that erecting fences and “No Trespassing” signs, even on 
secluded land, did not create an expectation of privacy in an open field). 
 82. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial 
photographs taken using a standard precision aerial mapping camera did not constitute a search, even 
where the target used elaborate security around the perimeter to entirely obscure ground-level views); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard 
within the curtilage of a home did not constitute a search). 
 83. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 84. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
 85. Id. at 209. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 211. 
 90. Id. at 214. 
 91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (indicating, without full elaboration, that this is not a per se rule, as “[a] person 
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disclosure or the reasonableness of one’s efforts to maintain practical obscurity 
through seclusion but rather by near-perfect concealment. Whatever law 
enforcement is able to observe from a vantage point to which they have legal 
access92—whether by crossing open fields surrounded by fencing,93 by peering 
through a small knothole in a tall fence,94 or by hiring a small plane to fly 
through unrestricted airspace95—has been exposed to the public and thus loses 
all protection under the Fourth Amendment. In the absence of complete and 
total concealment, the individual is said to assume the risk that the government 
will gain access to even the most secluded areas, even if by extraordinary or 
unexpected means.96 
This assumption of risk rationale is applied to “intangible” information in a 
second, related line of cases involving the disclosure of information to 
undercover and confidential informants.97 These informant cases place the 
dominance of the concealment-disclosure distinction in sharp relief. For just as 
considerable efforts to seclude tangible property have often proven legally 
insufficient in the absence of absolute concealment, only absolute silence ensures 
the maintenance of one’s privacy interest in information. The Court has 
repeatedly held that you rarely enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in your 
oral communications with another, even a trusted associate or a false friend,98 as 
you necessarily assume the risk that your confidence will be betrayed.99 As the 
Court remarked in United States v. White,100 “however strongly a defendant may 
trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected,”101 
 
does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere”). 
 92. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (“[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict 
some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point 
where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.” (citing United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983))). 
 93. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
179–80 (1984). 
 94. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210 (discussing with approval California’s analogy between overflight 
and observation through “a knothole or opening in a fence”). 
 95. Id. at 213–14. 
 96. Id. at 211–14 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy where a ten-foot fence 
surrounding marijuana plants on private property “might not shield these plants from the eyes of a 
citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus”). 
 97. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (holding that the defendant assumed 
the risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police, even by radio 
transmitter); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the defendant assumed the 
risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police and testify as to 
that content); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–40 (1963) (holding that the defendant 
assumed the risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police, 
including by using a hidden recording device). 
98 . On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
violation where defendant was simply “talking . . . indiscreetly with one he trusted”). 
 99. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not] protect[] a wrongdoer’s 
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”). 
 100. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 101. White, 401 U.S. at 749. 
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as the Fourth Amendment simply does not credit “a wrongdoer’s misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it.”102 Once again, attempts at seclusion—in the form of physical barriers 
(meeting in a home or office) and restricted access (limiting oneself to close 
confidants)—have proven insufficient to establish a legitimate privacy interest.103 
Only absolute concealment through absolute silence will suffice.104 
B. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine emerged from two strands of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence—the public exposure cases105 and the informant cases106—both of 
which developed prior to Katz but survived the transition from spatial privacy to 
protections grounded in one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.107 Indeed, Katz 
made this connection explicitly. First, the Court enunciated the rule at the heart 
of the third-party doctrine: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”108 Second, the Court supported this assertion with citations to two 
cases: United States v. Lee,109 a public exposure case involving the observation of 
contraband visible on the deck of a boat at sea,110 and Lewis v. United States,111 
an informant case involving an undercover agent invited into the defendant’s 
home.112 
The Court affirmed this approach just four years later in White, in which it 
confirmed the continuing validity of its informant jurisprudence post-Katz.113 
Defendant White sought to exclude the testimony of government agents 
regarding the content of conversations between himself and a cooperating 
informant, including at least one conversation that took place within White’s 
 
 102. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302. 
 103. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 747 (finding no legitimate privacy interest where a government 
informant brought a radio transmitter into the defendant’s home and automobile); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 
301–02 (finding that seclusion within a constitutionally protected physical area does not create a 
legitimate privacy interest in conversations with a third-party cooperating witness, even where that 
witness could be characterized as a close confidant). 
 104. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 762–65 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the chilling effect of 
the third-party doctrine and the assumption of risk rationale). 
 105. See Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 570–71 (discussing the exposure aspect of 
the third-party doctrine). 
 106. See id. at 567–69 (discussing the informant cases); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: 
Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 266–
67 (2016) (same). 
 107. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 598; see also White, 401 U.S. at 749 (holding that 
these cases were “left undisturbed by Katz”). 
 108. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 109. 274 U.S. 559 (1927). 
 110. See Lee, 274 U.S. at 563. 
 111. 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 112. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 206–07. 
 113. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971). 
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home.114 The Court held that White’s expectation of privacy in any information 
shared with a third party was not justified115 and that White had assumed the risk 
that the informant might share the content of their conversations with police.116 
Thus, by failing to maintain absolute concealment through absolute silence, 
White had obviated any legitimate privacy interest in the information that he 
revealed. 
These basic principles would serve as the foundation of the modern third-
party doctrine, which allows the government to obtain information from third 
parties without first procuring a search warrant.117 In the first of two leading 
cases, United States v. Miller,118 the Court upheld the use of a third-party 
subpoena to obtain the bank records of the defendant.119 Starting from the basic 
proposition in Katz—that information exposed to the public is no longer 
protected by the Fourth Amendment120—the Court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”121 Relying on the 
informant cases, the Court concluded that Miller “[took] the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information would be conveyed by that person to the 
Government,”122 even where the information was revealed only for a limited 
purpose.123 Here, the information provided to the government included deposit 
slips, checks, and account statements124—documents used by the account holder 
primarily to facilitate transactions with third parties and to manage the financial 
aspects of business operations.125 Although the account holder maintained an 
independent relationship with the bank, these documents primarily related to 
these external concerns. The bank acted, in essence, as a transactional 
intermediary.126 
 
 114. Id. at 746–47. 
 115. Id. at 749. 
 116. Id. at 752. 
 117. See Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 563 (“By disclosing to a third party, the 
subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed.”). 
 118. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 119. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436–37. 
 120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 121. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
 122. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)); see also Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (describing Miller’s reliance on an assumption of risk 
rationale). 
 123. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (confirming that the third-party doctrine applies “even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed” (first citing White, 401 U.S. at 752; then 
citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and then citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 
427 (1963))). 
 124. Id. at 438. 
 125. See id. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the records in question were 
“transmit[ted] to the bank in the course of his business operations” (quoting Burrows v. Superior 
Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974))). 
 126. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
3, 41 (2007) (describing the bank employees in Miller as “human intermediaries”). 
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The second of these cases, Smith v. Maryland,127 applied this same approach 
to a form of “intangible” information.128 Smith was suspected in a robbery and 
stalking incident, wherein someone made threatening and obscene phone calls to 
the victim.129 At the request of police, but without a warrant, “the telephone 
company . . . installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers 
dialed from the telephone at [Smith’s] home.”130 Prior to trial, Smith 
unsuccessfully “sought to suppress ‘all fruits derived from the pen register’ on 
the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant prior to its 
installation.”131 Affirming the denial of Smith’s motion to suppress, the Supreme 
Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers 
dialed because, as established by Miller and its predecessors, “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”132 But Smith extended this binary rule of absolute concealment to 
automated transactions that are highly unlikely to ever involve a human being, 
whether as a practical matter and/or because such access is contractually 
disclaimed. Thus, the third-party doctrine is triggered by the disclosure of 
information that occurs whenever an individual voluntarily interacts with an 
automated third-party processing system,133 where there is even the faintest 
possibility of human observation.134 
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Smith remains the Supreme Court’s most definitive statement on the 
application of the third-party doctrine to electronic communications and related 
technologies. Yet it was issued nearly forty years ago, at the leading edge of the 
digital age. In several key respects, Smith presaged the coming transformation of 
the information environment, applying the third-party doctrine to the 
transmission of information by an automated system—owned and operated by a 
private intermediary—that collects, processes, and stores associated data. But 
the Smith Court could not have possibly imagined the speed and scale of the 
coming advancements in computer and information technologies nor the 
challenges these developments would present for the Court’s “modern” third-
party doctrine. In this Section, I address two advancements in particular: the 
initial shift to digitized electronic communications and the move to cloud 
computing. 
 
 127. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 128. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 
(1977)) (addressing the search and seizure of telephone numbers dialed, rather than physical 
documents or contents of conversations). 
 129. Id. at 737. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 743–44. 
 133. Id. at 744–45 (declining “to hold that a different constitutional result is required because 
the telephone company has decided to automate”). 
 134. See Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 600 (discussing the conflict between the 
automation rationale and the human-observer theory of the third-party doctrine). 
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The transition from analog to digitized electronic communication,135 such as 
email,136 created a gap in privacy regulation that left personal communications 
vulnerable both to interception during transmission and to retrieval from the 
storage facilities of the sender, recipient, or service provider.137 Tasked by 
Congress in the mid-1980s to investigate potential privacy concerns related to 
these new electronic communication and surveillance technologies,138 the Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) concluded that neither the existing statutory 
protections nor judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment were adequate 
to safeguard individual privacy interests.139 Of particular relevance here, the 
OTA expressed concern that application of the third-party doctrine—holding 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed or 
voluntarily conveyed to a third party140—might well extinguish Fourth 
Amendment protections for stored electronic communications.141 
This led Congress to enact the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA),142 which extended existing statutory restrictions on the use of 
traditional wiretaps to the interception of electronic data transmissions143 while 
placing lesser restrictions on government access to both the content of stored 
electronic communications144 and the data provided to third-party remote-
computing services for storage and processing.145 In the three decades since the 
passage of the ECPA, however, these statutory protections have come under 
increasing criticism.146 Law enforcement has taken advantage of a dramatic 
increase in remote storage capabilities to avoid the more onerous requirements 
of the ECPA’s wiretap provisions by instead “accessing stored electronic 
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communications, such as emails, directly from a service provider.”147 In many 
cases, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which governs such access, waives 
the more stringent warrant requirement in favor of a subpoena or court order,148 
raising privacy concerns.149 
The “cloud computing revolution”150 amplifies and extends the gap in 
online privacy law protections identified by the OTA. In a typical cloud 
computing system, some combination of computing resources (“e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services”) is outsourced to a third party, which 
owns, manages, and operates those systems.151 Core software applications and all 
associated data—whether encompassed in the communication from user to user, 
or created and collected in the course of that interaction with the system—may 
be maintained entirely on external facilities under the control of the provider.152 
Email services provide an excellent example of this model. The Google web-
based email service Gmail, for instance, operates on a cloud computing 
Software-as-a-Service model.153 The email application, user’s emails, and all 
associated data reside on Google’s remote servers and are accessible by the user 
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word processing, presentation, spreadsheet and other productivity tools.” Id. Microsoft’s Office suite 
products now similarly function on a SaaS model. Id. 
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via web browser or program interface. Cloud storage services, such as Dropbox, 
are functionally similar.154 Dropbox utilizes user-downloaded software 
applications to automatically transfer copies of a user’s documents and other 
computer files to the service’s remote cloud servers.155 These files are synced 
across the user’s computers and mobile devices, each interacting with the 
Dropbox servers, creating multiple copies in multiple locations.156 
From a Fourth Amendment perspective, cloud-computing systems share 
several key characteristics. First, they are a distributed computing model with 
components spread across a multitude of facilities owned and/or operated by 
private third parties.157 Second, these automated third-party services are 
designed to actively solicit and passively collect, store, generate, utilize, and 
analyze “vast quantities of personal data.”158 Some of that data is provided by 
the user and some is created as a product of system operations, with the latter 
often derived from user-provided content.159 Third, this information is collected, 
generated, stored, and analyzed in the context of a commercial relationship and 
in furtherance of “a variety of legitimate business purposes.”160 Fourth, the rapid 
growth of cloud-computing facilities allows for the wholesale migration of 
computer systems and essential services to third-party providers,161 significantly 
expanding both the quantity and range of information entrusted to third-party 
providers.162 Finally, cloud-computing systems and associated data practices are 
now nearly impossible to avoid in the course of meaningful social and economic 
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engagement with modern daily life.163 
In sharp contrast to this model of ubiquitously distributed computing and 
data flows, the Fourth Amendment remains stubbornly focused on one’s ability 
to conceal and control access to personal information. Information disclosed to a 
third party, even an automated system with little chance of human 
observation,164 generally no longer enjoys Fourth Amendment protections.165 It 
is an “approach . . . ill suited to the digital age,”166 in which “the third-party 
doctrine has become a greedy exception that leaves little room over for the 
Fourth Amendment.”167 Congress struggles to legislate even the most targeted 
exceptions,168 while courts strain to analogize the postal service of 1877169 to 
modern communication via email170 or text message.171 But as Chief Justice 
Roberts observed in Riley v. California,172 strained analogies often “crumble[] 
entirely” when applied to cloud computing.173 
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In the absence of clear limitations on the third-party doctrine, it seems the 
classic case of an exception that threatens to swallow the rule. As Eleventh 
Circuit Judge Beverly Martin recently warned: 
[B]lunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to allow the 
government access to a staggering amount of information that surely 
must be protected under the Fourth Amendment . . . . [B]y allowing a 
third-party company access to our e-mail accounts, the websites we 
visit, and our search-engine history—all for legitimate business 
purposes—we give up any privacy interest in that information. 
 And why stop there? Nearly every website collects information 
about what we do when we visit. [Broad application of the third-party 
doctrine] allows the government to know from YouTube.com what we 
watch, or Facebook.com what we post or whom we “friend,” or 
Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipedia.com [sic] what we research, 
or Match.com whom we date—all without a warrant. In fact, the 
government could ask “cloud”-based file-sharing services like Dropbox 
or Apple’s iCloud for all the files we relinquish to their servers. I am 
convinced that most internet users would be shocked by this.174 
Although there is precious little case law addressing the application of the 
third-party doctrine to these networked technologies, there are certainly 
indications that Judge Martin’s concerns are well founded. As Laura Donohue 
has observed, the Supreme Court “has been slow to recognize a Fourth 
Amendment interest in digital communications,” and “the lower courts remain 
divided” on many key applications—including protections for the content of 
both email and text messages.175 And as Justice Gorsuch recently observed, the 
Supreme Court’s binary approach to the third-party doctrine leads to potentially 
untenable results. 
 The problem isn’t with the [lower court’s] application of Smith and 
Miller but with the cases themselves. Can the government demand a 
copy of all your e-mails from Google or Microsoft without implicating 
your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure your DNA from 
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith and Miller say 
yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz. But that result 
strikes most lawyers and judges today—me included—as pretty 
unlikely.176 
But are such results really so unlikely? In one recent case in which the 
government sought “essentially . . . every posting and action . . . taken through 
Facebook,”177 a New York court held that “under the Third-Party Doctrine only 
a subpoena and prior notice (a much lower hurdle than probable cause) are 
 
devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself”). Interestingly, Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested, without so deciding, that for Fourth Amendment purposes it “generally 
makes little difference” whether data is stored locally or in the cloud. Id. 
 174. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535–36 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 175. Donohue, Digital World, supra note 1, at 651–56. 
 176. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 177. In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 24 (App. Div. 2015), 
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needed to compel an ISP to disclose the contents of an email or of files stored on 
a server.”178 To borrow the words of Judge Martin, “I am convinced that most 
internet users would be shocked by this.”179 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
My proposal for limiting the reach of the third-party doctrine proceeds in 
three parts. In Part III.A, I argue that our constitutional commitment to freedom 
of thought is historically and properly connected to the enumeration of “papers” 
as a distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection. This Part begins with an 
explication of freedom of thought, primarily as an aspect of First Amendment 
doctrine. I then turn to the relationship between freedom of thought and privacy 
rights, including the relevance of certain core Fourth Amendment principles, 
with a focus on the link between protections for personal papers and 
autonomous thought. 
In Part III.B, I seek to revive the connection between freedom of thought 
and personal papers. I begin by exploring various models of cognition and the 
role of cognitive artifacts in these processes and systems. I then explain how 
papers and their digital equivalents serve as cognitive artifacts capable of 
representing and storing information, and thus function as integral components 
of a cognitive system performing cognitive tasks. Although conceptualized 
through the lens of contemporary cognitive science, this account is consistent 
with historical protections for personal papers, translating the intuition of prior 
generations into current cognitive theory. 
In Part III.C, I propose changes to the third-party doctrine intended to 
reestablish enhanced constitutional protections for papers and their digital 
equivalents when functioning as cognitive artifacts. In the emerging information 
environment, these cognitive artifacts are no longer confined within protected 
spaces and personal confidences but are now distributed across automated third-
party networks that store, process, and transfer the information. Yet they remain 
integral components of our cognitive processes. Indeed, there is good reason to 
conclude that our ability to readily access and incorporate vast stores of 
information maintained, represented, stored, and even operated upon by 
cognitive artifacts—as well as, consequently, our growing reliance on these 
components of information processing—has only reinforced the role of these 
artifacts in human cognition. By this account, in which papers are recognized and 
valued as cognitive artifacts, our constitutional commitment to freedom of 
thought compels modifications to the third-party doctrine to restore certain 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
A. Freedom of Thought, Privacy of Thought, and Fourth Amendment Papers 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the central importance of 
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protecting individual freedom of thought from government interference.180 It 
“was first recognized by the Supreme Court in . . . 1878,” in the context of 
religious belief,181 and in secular matters “by Justices Holmes and Brandeis as 
part of their dissenting tradition in free speech cases in the 1910s and 1920s.”182 
In 1937, Justice Cardozo referred to freedom of thought as “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”183 In 1969, 
Justice Marshall wrote that “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the 
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”184 And in 
2002, Justice Kennedy declared that “[t]he right to think is the beginning of 
freedom.”185 Yet, despite this history, the Court has remained largely 
noncommittal as to the constitutional foundations and substance of this “most 
vital of our liberties.”186 
Freedom of thought is most often framed by its relationship to the First 
Amendment.187 Thomas Jefferson, for instance, wrote of the importance of “the 
rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing.”188 In the 
narrower form of this conception, freedom of thought is regarded for its 
instrumental value in promoting the outwardly expressive liberties of speech, 
association, assembly, and free exercise.189 In its more expansive form, freedom 
of thought is imbued with the intrinsic value of individual autonomy and 
integrity.190 In some respects, these different conceptions of freedom of thought 
parallel differing views of First Amendment protections for free expression. 
Thus, by exploring the asserted values of free expression, we gain insight into the 
substance of freedom of thought. 
Protections for free expression are generally justified by reference to one of 
three values: promotion of democratic self-governance, the pursuit of truth, or 
the preservation of individual autonomy and self-realization.191 The first of these 
 
 180. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The government ‘cannot 
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.’” 
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969))); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout freedom of thought there can be no free society.”); Doe v. 
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 777 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[F]reedom of the mind occupies a highly-
protected position in our constitutional heritage.”); Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 412 
(“The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of thought 
is at the foundation of what it means to be a free society.”). 
 181. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 410 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937). 
 184. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 185. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
 186. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 388–89. 
 187. See, e.g., id. 
 188. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to David Humphreys, in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
86, 90 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). 
 189. See Kolber, supra note 41, at 1387–88. 
 190. See Tuchman, supra note 47, at 2280. 
 191. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-
Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 89–93 (2012) (“[T]hree general rationales are most commonly 
2018] COGNITIVE THEORY 79 
values is distinctly instrumental in nature, presenting free expression as a 
necessary condition for the realization of democratic self-governance.192 This 
approach preferences both certain forms of expression (public discourse and 
deliberation) and certain topics (political speech) as worthy of greater 
protection.193 The second of these values justifies protections for free expression 
as instrumental to the pursuit of truth194—but a sort of public truth. In this 
context, free expression is valued as a necessary condition to the development 
and maintenance of a “marketplace of ideas,” in which competing theories and 
opinions are tested, and from which the truth is likely to emerge.195 The third 
value, preservation of individual autonomy and self-realization,196 is different in 
kind from these first two values. Apart from the promotion of public values such 
as democratic self-governance or realization of a public truth, this account is 
unmistakably focused on the individual, with derivative benefits to society at 
large. Free expression is instrumentally valued as “an integral part of the 
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self,”197 
fostering “individual self-realization and self-determination”198—a personal 
truth. These instrumental values are closely tied to the intrinsic value of free 
expression as “an essential attribute of individual personhood.”199 Thus, speech 
“receive[s] constitutional protection (at least in part) as [an] embodiment[] of 
collective respect for individual liberty or autonomy.”200 
Freedom of thought implicates many of these same concerns as to 
justification, value, and substance. Adam Kolber, for instance, began with what 
he referred to as a distinction between the “intertwined” and “independent” 
views of freedom of thought.201 Specifically, he asked “whether the First 
Amendment protects thought itself . . . or only protects thought when it is linked 
to expression.”202 Under the intertwined view, “freedom of thought holds only 
instrumental value from a First Amendment perspective . . . as a way of 
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promoting expression.”203 In an absence of “a connection to expression,” 
“freedom of thought holds only modest value.”204 This narrow focus on the 
instrumental value of freedom of thought has the benefit of reinforcing 
consistency with theories of free expression, but it potentially suffers from the 
implicit limitations of those views (e.g., public discourse and deliberation, the 
search for a public truth, and elevated protections for political speech). The 
independent view, on the other hand, “protects freedom of thought even in cases 
that lack recognized forms of expression.”205 Kolber recognized two potential 
supporting theories for this view. The first is simply that the First Amendment 
“values thought separately from expression.”206 The second is that, even if 
“thought is only instrumentally valuable from a First Amendment 
perspective[,] . . . the connection between thought and expression [is] so close 
and important that we need not find expression in any particular case.”207 
Until recently, these contested accounts of freedom of thought have 
generally eluded resolution because resolution has never been required.208 The 
purely internal workings of our minds are locked within flesh and bone, beyond 
penetration and without the need for legal protections.209 As Marc Jonathan 
Blitz has observed, freedom of thought has been invoked “not as a means for 
protecting our already protected internal mental freedom, but rather as a 
justification for shielding certain external actions . . . that many view as having a 
close connection to, or providing indispensable support for, our capacity to think 
freely and autonomously.”210 
The Supreme Court, for example, has invoked freedom of thought in 
cases barring the government from penalizing us for joining, or 
refusing to join, certain political groups, for refusing to affirm certain 
government-mandated messages or commitments (in loyalty oaths, flag 
salutes, or license plates), or for watching an obscene film in our own 
home. All of these activities are performed in the external world, not in 
the realm of pure fantasy or imagination. But the Court held that 
punishing them was tantamount to punishing thought.211 
Freedom of thought has thus been protected from external sources of 
government interference with respect to the information we receive, disseminate, 
adopt, and discuss with nongovernmental actors. Likewise, the government may 
act to preserve freedom of thought from excessive external interference by 
others. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Kovacs v. Cooper,212 the legislature 
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may impose reasonable restrictions intended to “safeguard[] the steadily 
narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection[, for] [w]ithout such 
opportunities freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase, and without 
freedom of thought there can be no free society.”213 
This focus on external interference underscores the importance of 
distinguishing between the object of protection and the conditions necessary for 
its protection. Seana Shiffrin, for instance, identified the object of protection as 
“the process by which ideas and expressions are generated, nurtured, and 
mooted, both in individuals and within groups.”214 Shiffrin then described the 
conditions necessary to realize this value: 
The autonomous agent must have some ability to control what 
influences she is exposed to, to what subjects she directs her mind, and 
whether she, at all times, directs her mind toward anything at all or 
instead “spaces out” and allows the mind to relax and wander. To 
function as an independent thinker and evaluator, the individual must 
have domains in which she may enjoy the privacy of her thoughts.215 
Thus, just as “individual freedom of thought is a clear requisite for meaningful 
freedom of speech protections,”216 so too is privacy of thought regarded as a 
necessary condition for freedom of thought.217 
Neil Richards similarly observed that “the development of ideas and beliefs 
often takes place best in solitary contemplation or collaboration with a few 
trusted confidants,”218 systematizing many of these various threads under a 
theory of what he terms “intellectual privacy.”219 
Intellectual privacy is the ability, whether protected by law or social 
circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted 
gaze or interference of others . . . . The ability to freely make up our 
minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a substantial 
measure of intellectual privacy. In this way, intellectual privacy is a 
cornerstone of meaningful First Amendment liberties.220 
Richards described intellectual privacy as consisting of four elements: “the 
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deterring gaze or interfering actions of others. Without intellectual privacy, we would be 
less willing to investigate ideas and hypotheses that might turn out to be wrong, 
controversial, or deviant. Intellectual privacy thus permits us to experiment with ideas in 
relative seclusion without having to disclose them before we have developed them, 
considered them, and decided whether to adopt them as our own. 
Id. at 425. 
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freedom of thought and belief, spatial privacy, the freedom of intellectual 
exploration, and the confidentiality of communication.”221 Freedom of thought 
and belief is “the precondition for all other political and religious rights.”222 It 
“protects our ability to hold beliefs”223 by safeguarding “the individual’s 
thoughts from scrutiny or unwilling disclosure.”224 Spatial privacy “refers to the 
protection of places—physical, social, or otherwise—against intrusion or 
surveillance,” which “allow[s] us to think freely and without interference.”225 
Freedom of intellectual exploration protects the individual’s ability to develop 
new ideas and discover new truths by preserving our “right to receive, read, and 
engage with information in private.”226 Finally, confidentiality of communication 
“protects the relationships in which information is shared, allowing candid 
discussion away from the prying ears of others. It allows us to share our 
questions and tentative conclusions with confidence that our thoughts will not be 
made public until we are ready.”227 
Richards’s conception of intellectual privacy prioritized the protection of 
autonomous thought processes, including the ability to think freely and without 
interference, to develop new ideas and discover new truths, and to vet our 
thoughts with close confidants. The preservation of autonomous thought in turn 
requires that we protect our right to receive, read, and engage with information; 
limit external scrutiny of our thought processes, including the maintenance of 
private spaces free from outside interference; safeguard our thoughts from the 
threat of unwilling disclosure; and protect those confidential communications 
through which we test and refine our thoughts, ideas, and beliefs.228 Thus, 
Richards made explicit the connection between freedom of thought (as an 
element of First Amendment theory) and certain forms of privacy protection.229 
He argued “that a meaningful measure of privacy is critical to the most basic 
operations of expression, because it gives new ideas the room they need to 
grow.”230 Justice Brandeis recognized this connection in his famous dissent in 
Olmstead, tying freedom of thought to core Fourth Amendment concerns.231 
“The makers of our Constitution,” Brandeis wrote, “sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,” 
free from “unjustifiable intrusion by the Government . . . [in] violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”232 Richards likewise invoked familiar Fourth Amendment 
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safeguards against intrusive surveillance, with specific protections shaped by 
reference to the First Amendment values sought to be preserved233—be it 
promoting democratic self-governance, truth-seeking, or preserving individual 
autonomy and self-realization.234 
This connection between freedom of thought and core Fourth Amendment 
principles can be traced to influences predating the Revolution. It was a view 
drawn from both the English and the colonial experiences. In England, Chief 
Justice Charles Pratt235 presided over two landmark cases challenging the 
Crown’s use of general warrants to search and seize personal papers, and in both, 
Pratt affirmed the status of personal papers as a unique and invaluable form of 
property.236 In Entick v. Carrington,237 Pratt distinguished personal papers as a 
man’s “dearest property . . . so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly 
bear an inspection.”238 And in Wilkes v. Wood,239 personal papers were 
described as the “promulgation of our most private concerns” and as “affairs of 
the most secret personal nature,” the seizure of which perpetrates a harm for 
which almost “no reparation whatsoever could be made.”240 As one member of 
the House of Commons commented in parliamentary debates associated with 
these cases, personal papers are “often dearer to a man than his heart’s 
blood.”241 These events were closely followed in the colonies, which “absorbed 
the message of the separate iniquity of seizing papers [and] carried Entick into 
American law.”242 
In The Original Fourth Amendment, Laura Donohue described in brilliant 
detail how “these judicial challenges—and the legal treatises on which they were 
based—were to profoundly shape the Founding Fathers’ introduction and 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”243 Even before the ratification of a 
Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights, “the newly formed American states 
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objected to the use of promiscuous search and seizure.”244 Utilizing fairly 
consistent language, early state constitutions provided express protection for 
papers, as distinct from other personal property (i.e., effects).245 Likewise, during 
ratification of the Federal Constitution, various commentators and several state 
conventions proposed the addition of analogous provisions.246 This carried 
through to the final, now familiar, language of the Fourth Amendment, 
identifying “persons, houses, papers, and effects” as related but discrete areas of 
concern.247 In its earliest decisions interpreting and applying this text, the 
Supreme Court returned to the English cases and colonial experience, 
acknowledging their profound influence on the framing of the Fourth 
Amendment. In Boyd v. United States,248 for instance, Justice Bradley wrote of 
Entick and the surrounding turmoil: 
 As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and 
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this 
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and 
ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently 
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as 
sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches 
and seizures.249 
And it was in Boyd that the Court affirmed the special status of “a man’s private 
books and papers.”250 
The Boyd Court recognized two constitutional grounds for this expansive, 
almost absolute protection.251 The Fourth Amendment protected personal 
papers as a subset of personal property more generally, severely restricting 
governmental trespass absent a sufficient competing interest in that property 
beyond mere evidence of a crime.252 Buttressing these protections were those 
provided by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which 
shielded papers that were testimonial in nature.253 Working in tandem—such 
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that they “r[a]n almost into each other”254—the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
thus afforded almost categorical protection against the search, seizure, and 
evidentiary use of personal papers by government officials. 
Unfortunately, these exceptional protections for personal papers proved too 
fragile to survive intact. In Warden v. Hayden,255 the Court eliminated the mere 
evidence rule256 and with it the claim to heightened protection for papers under 
the Fourth Amendment.257 And in Andresen v. Maryland,258 the Court found no 
violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination 
where the target of a search warrant was not required to prepare, produce, or 
authenticate the papers in question.259 In less than ten years, the Court 
essentially eliminated the exceptional constitutional protections for personal 
papers. 
After Hayden and Andresen, personal papers were no longer to be uniquely 
valued as constituent elements of the inner workings of the mind but as mere 
objects, regressing to just another form of chattel. The conveyance of documents 
through and to third parties might have presented a challenge to this ordinary 
property-based approach, but the secrecy-based rule of Ex parte Jackson260 
allowed the Court to avoid any inconsistency.261 When the Court moved away 
from an explicitly property-based approach in Katz, adopting instead the 
expectation-of-privacy test,262 questions regarding the special status of papers 
might well have reemerged. Instead the Court defaulted to familiar binaries (e.g., 
private versus public, secrecy versus disclosure) that again superseded questions 
regarding privacy protections for papers qua papers. As a matter of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the link between freedom of thought, the Fourth 
Amendment, and the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of protection 
was effectively obscured. 
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Current Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects both the asserted historical 
commitment to the protection of personal papers and the Court’s failure to 
articulate either a consistent supporting theory or sufficient guidance as to the 
reach of any such safeguards. Writing for the majority in Carpenter v. United 
States,263 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that a blanket rule permitting the 
warrantless search of “any personal information reduced to document form”—
including “private letters”—would be untenable.264 Yet Roberts provided no 
explicit rationale for excepting this particular class of papers from the traditional 
rule of the third-party doctrine. In that same case, several of the dissenting 
Justices likewise recognized that personal papers likely enjoy a special status 
under Fourth Amendment doctrine but conditioned that enhanced protection on 
an individual’s property interest in those papers—characterizing their possession 
by a third party as a bailment.265 Chief Justice Roberts agreed that an exception 
for the “modern-day equivalents” of personal papers would be “sensible” but 
invoked the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard rather than the 
dissenters’ property rationale.266 
In the parts that follow, I propose both an animating rationale for 
protecting personal papers and guidelines for determining those circumstances 
justifying an exception to the third-party doctrine. 
B. Cognitive Processes and Cognitive Artifacts 
In this Part, I turn to cognitive science to demonstrate how our 
constitutional commitment to freedom of thought is threatened by the failure to 
provide adequate Fourth Amendment protections for information stored on 
third-party computer systems. Cognitive science refers to “the interdisciplinary 
study of mind and intelligence, embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial 
intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.”267 I begin by exploring 
the four principal models of human cognition that have emerged within cognitive 
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science, including the traditional internalist view and three variations of situated 
cognition theory (embodied cognition, embedded cognition, and 
extended/distributed cognition).268 I then examine the role of cognitive artifacts 
within these models. 
Cognitive artifacts are devices through and by which humans “extend 
cognitive abilities, such as abstract thought, memory, problem solving, and 
language use.”269 This baseline theory of human cognition supports the intuitive 
sense of the Framers that autonomous thought requires privacy of thought and 
that personal papers are often key to the development of ideas and beliefs. More 
specifically, the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of Fourth 
Amendment protection reflects an understanding (whether explicit or 
instinctive) that humans employ personal papers as cognitive artifacts integral to 
our cognitive processes. Maintaining freedom of thought therefore requires that 
personal papers be safeguarded against government interference. But these 
cognitive models do something more. They provide a conceptual structure not 
only to explain enhanced privacy protections for personal papers but also to 
justify an exception to the third-party doctrine that extends these enhanced 
protections to certain information stored on third-party computer systems. 
Cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser defined cognition as “all the processes 
by which . . . sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, 
recovered, and used.”270 But how are these intellectual processes carried out? 
“The central hypothesis of cognitive science is that [human cognitive processes] 
can best be understood in terms of [(a)] representational structures in the mind 
and [(b)] computational procedures that operate on those structures.”271 It is an 
approach that evolved from the development of modern logic and computing272 
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and continues to draw on these foundations: 
 Most work in cognitive science assumes that the mind has mental 
representations analogous to computer data structures, and 
computational procedures similar to computational algorithms. 
Cognitive theorists have proposed that the mind contains such mental 
representations as logical propositions, rules, concepts, images, and 
analogies, and that it uses mental procedures such as deduction, search, 
matching, rotating, and retrieval.273 
Utilizing these basic elements of mental representation and computational 
procedure, cognitive science theorizes functional models of information 
processing––perception, attention, language, memory, and thought. 
In constructing these functional models, some of the most basic and 
contested questions revolve around the structure of the cognitive system in 
which these processes occur. Broadly speaking, two models of cognitive 
processing and cognitive systems have emerged. The traditional internalist view is 
of the mind as “an abstract information processor,”274 conceptually distinct from 
the corporeal body,275 with “[p]erceptual and motor systems . . . serv[ing] merely 
as peripheral input and output devices.”276 Situated cognition theory, on the other 
hand, shifts away from focusing on “cognitive processes realized in the brain 
[and] towards cognitive processes involving brain, body, and the 
environment.”277 This broad theory can be roughly divided into three distinct but 
related theses: 
First, the embodied cognition thesis, which claims that cognition 
depends on, and is sometimes constituted by, the human body. Second, 
the embedded cognition thesis, which claims that our cognitive 
processes are sometimes shaped but not constituted by bio-external 
resources. Third, the [extended cognition thesis], which claim[s] that 
cognitive states and processes, under certain conditions, are distributed 
across embodied agents and cognitive artifacts or other bio-external 
resources.278 
As these descriptions suggest, key points of differentiation between these various 
theses include the locus of cognition and the role of bioexternal resources 
(including cognitive artifacts) in cognitive systems and processes. 
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Proponents of embodied cognition claim that “aspects of the agent’s body 
beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in 
cognitive processing,”279 and thus “that the mind must be understood in the 
context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with the world.”280 We 
can distinguish between the “weak” and “strong” forms of embodied cognition 
by reference to the nature and degree of integration between mind and body. 
“Weak embodied cognition claims that human cognitive processes sometimes 
depend on and are shaped by the body but are not constituted by it. Strong 
embodied cognition, on the other hand, claims that cognition is partly 
constituted by the body.”281 In either case, bioexternal resources play no 
constitutive role in human cognitive processes.282 
Building on the distinction between the weak and strong forms of embodied 
cognition, it is helpful to generalize the key point of differentiation as between 
(a) those resources that merely aid cognition283 and (b) those resources that are 
constitutive of a cognitive process or system.284 Note that in applying this 
distinction to the embodied cognition thesis, the relevant resource to be 
considered is the physical body in its relation to the mind.285 Embedded 
cognition and extended cognition move beyond the mind-body conception to 
consider whether artifacts and other external resources merely aid our cognitive 
processes or may function as constitutive elements of certain cognitive processes 
residing in a cognitive system.286 Embedded cognition generally treats these 
external resources as aids to cognition (e.g., scaffolding).287 Extended cognition, 
on the other hand, recognizes that external resources may be “potentially 
integrated deeply into the cognitive processes of their users, thereby extending 
their cognitive processes” as constitutive elements of that system.288 Although 
there is significant variation in the precise contours of this approach, at the 
approach’s fullest is “the claim that new layers of non-biological scaffolding 
(pens, papers, software packages and the like) might literally become 
incorporated into the very mechanisms of (some kinds of) human thought.”289 
In considering the role of external resources within these processes and 
systems, we pay particular attention to cognitive artifacts. An artifact is generally 
defined as “a physical object intentionally designed, made, and used for a 
particular purpose.”290 Cognitive artifacts, generally speaking, are a specific type 
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of artifact, the purpose of which is to aid, enhance, or improve cognition.291 
Philosophy and technology scholar Robert Clowes offered this definition: 
Provisionally and pragmatically . . . we shall define cognitive artefacts 
as artificial devices which either perform functions that, were they 
carried out in the brain should count as cognitive, or significantly 
support, extend or complement such functions . . . . At this stage, we 
need not defend a strong position on whether cognitive technologies 
can become actual parts of our minds, and thus extend our minds, as 
the thesis of the extended mind contends, or merely act as a new sort of 
environment, niche or scaffold in which our minds operate. We merely 
hold that we, and our minds, have undergone profound changes, as we 
create and adopt new cognitive technologies.292 
Psychologist Donald Norman, who is widely credited with introducing the 
concept, defined cognitive artifacts as “artificial devices that maintain, display, or 
operate upon information in order to serve a representational function and that 
affect human cognitive performance.”293 Expanding on the functional aspect, 
Philip Brey identified the ability of a cognitive artifact “to represent, store, 
retrieve and manipulate information,”294 while Nancy J. Nersessian emphasized 
“the cognitive properties of generating, manipulating, or propagating 
representations.”295 As Richard Heersmink observed, these definitions have 
three elements in common: “cognitive artifacts are defined as (a) human-made, 
physical objects” that (b) “provide (and sometimes manipulate or process) 
representational information,” and (c) “are deployed by human agents for the 
purpose of functionally contributing to performing a cognitive task.”296 
According to Heersmink, it is the last of these elements that is the “most 
distinctive property” of a cognitive artifact.297 Brey echoed this point, remarking 
that a “distinguishing feature of cognitive artifacts is that they do not just 
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function as objects of cognition, like other structure [sic] in the world, but that 
they become integral components of the information processing task itself.”298 
Focusing on these last two points, there is a certain amount of disagreement 
inherent in the various models of human cognition regarding both the precise 
manner in which cognitive artifacts contribute to the performance of a cognitive 
task and the degree to which cognitive artifacts are integrated into the cognitive 
process itself. For purposes of this Article, a few examples will suffice. Edwin 
Hutchins posited that “[c]ognitive artifacts are involved in a process of 
organizing functional skills into functional systems” and thereby “produce 
cognitive effects by bringing functional skills into coordination with various 
kinds of structure.”299 Heersmink argued: 
The informational properties and functionalities of [cognitive] artefacts 
are crucial for performing a wide range of cognitive tasks, including 
navigating, calculating, planning, remembering, decision-making, and 
reasoning . . . . The function of cognitive artefacts . . . is to provide task-
relevant information, thereby complementing internal storage and 
processing systems and making certain cognitive tasks easier, faster, 
more reliable, or possible at all. A map, for example, is a cognitive 
artefact because its function is to provide task-relevant information 
used for navigating.300 
Thus, “cognitive function [may be characterized] as an emergent property of the 
interaction between intentional, embodied agents, and cognitive artefacts.”301 
In an effort to more clearly illustrate the relationship between cognitive 
artifacts and the cognitive tasks for which they are employed, I will closely 
examine one such task: memory. Most people are all too aware of our increasing 
reliance on digital devices and internet access.302 Most apparently, this 
interdependence evidences our desire for connecting—linking together 
individuals and organizations, whether synchronously or asynchronously, at 
virtually any time and from any place. But it also reflects our growing appetite 
for access to information—both the information that we ourselves create and 
information available from other known and unknown sources. Our ubiquitous 
smartphones are themselves a powerful example, with processing speeds and 
self-contained data storage capabilities303 that were almost unimaginable just 
years earlier. A variety of native applications—software residing on and running 
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in the smartphone environment—allow the user to easily create, modify, 
organize, and access this locally stored data.304 Other applications perform these 
and other data functions without the involvement and/or knowledge of the 
user.305 Of course, these same devices also provide network access through web 
browsers (e.g., Safari or Chrome), email clients (e.g., Outlook or Apple’s Mail), 
and remote storage applications (e.g., Dropbox or Google Drive). Through the 
network, users gain access to an almost inconceivable amount of remotely stored 
data, as well as network-based applications providing data creation, 
modification, organization, and access functions similar to those provided by 
native applications. 
One phenomenon of this environment—where the amount of available data 
is so great, and where that data is easily created, stored, organized, and 
accessed—is what has been called memory offloading.306 “Inundated by more 
information than we can possibly hold in our heads, we’re increasingly handing 
off the job of remembering” to our devices and network-based applications.307 
This offloaded memory usually takes two forms. The first form can be broadly 
thought of as generalized information about our individual lives. Rather than 
remembering phone numbers and addresses, we store them in our contacts 
database. Events are calendared electronically and forgotten until the reminder 
pops up on our phone. Facts contained in correspondence are stored in 
searchable email archives. Meeting notes are drafted and stored on a remote 
access server. The second form is generalized information about the world at 
large. What is the capital of Panama? What is the difference between spiders and 
insects? What is the square root of 196? Who wrote the poem “Ode to 
Autumn”? Rather than committing these facts to memory, we turn to Google. 
And, having looked them up once, “[w]e don’t even have to remember the 
answers—we can just look them up again.”308 
This phenomenon has been described as a process in which “[w]e are 
becoming symbiotic with our computer tools.”309 Or, in the words of 
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anthropologist Amber Case, “We are all cyborgs now.”310 The metaphor is, in 
many respects, rather appropriate. Drawing on a definition from 1960s space 
exploration, Case defined a cyborg as “an organism to which exogenous 
components have been added for the purpose of adapting to new 
environments.”311 In this case, that new environment is one in which the amount 
of information both readily available to and thrust upon the individual is beyond 
the capacity of our organic brains.312 We therefore outsource certain memory 
tasks to “exogenous components” such as smartphones, through which we 
create, modify, organize, and access information distributed across vast remote 
networks.313 It is a deepening symbiotic relationship between users and 
computers that appears to be evolving toward an interconnected system—a 
system in which we “remember less by knowing information than by knowing 
where the information can be found.”314 As we offload memory to digital devices 
and networks, “forgetting” the substantive information, we are getting better at 
remembering where the information is and/or how to find it.315 
A simple example reframes the process of memory offloading to illustrate 
how cognitive artifacts are deployed in the new information environment. As 
described previously, Dropbox is a remote file-storage application that 
automatically syncs copies of a user’s digital files to Dropbox’s servers.316 These 
files are then accessible to the user across multiple devices.317 In the context of 
several of the cognitive models previously described, these stored files function 
as classic examples of cognitive artifacts, in that they are artificial devices (here, 
intangible) that carry representational information (little different from a 
shopping list, calendar, or diary) created and deployed “for the purpose of 
functionally contributing to performing a cognitive task”318 such as memory or 
problem solving. 
This conception of personal papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive 
artifacts is entirely consistent with historical protections for personal papers: 
 The particular concern of eighteenth-century commentators focused 
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on papers, such as diaries, intended solely for the use and perusal of 
the author. In that era, writing out one’s ideas for purely private 
analysis and reflection was seen as an essential part of the thought 
process. Commentators regarded these writings as essentially 
unspoken thoughts that had never left the bosom of the thinker. 
Exposing to government scrutiny documents essential to the private 
development of ideas would stultify normal intellectual life and 
development.319 
It was this view of personal papers as “an essential part of the thought 
process”320 that justified their special status as a man’s “dearest property.”321 
Likewise, what distinguishes cognitive artifacts from other objects of cognition is 
their function as “integral components of the information processing task 
itself.”322 
Moreover, by offloading these files to Dropbox, the user employs additional 
cognitive artifacts. Using Heersmink’s approach, both the Dropbox service on 
which the file is stored and the computer through which the file is accessed can 
be described as “provid[ing] task-relevant information, thereby complementing 
internal storage and processing systems and making certain cognitive tasks 
easier, faster, more reliable, or possible at all.”323 The concept of computer 
systems as cognitive artifacts is certainly more contentious. But putting aside the 
theoretical disputes within cognitive science, many if not most users perceive 
Dropbox as significantly supporting, extending, and complementing cognitive 
functions324 by extending their ability to “represent, store, retrieve and 
manipulate information.”325 At first blush, this likely seems far afield of any 
historical protections for personal papers, but this is not necessarily so. The 
purpose of a journal or diary, for instance, is to collect and store individual 
representational artifacts created by the author as an integral component of 
personal memory, to be accessed as needed to contribute to the cognitive task of 
remembering.326 Similarly, a personal library may function as a collection of 
potential cognitive artifacts327 to be employed in various cognitive tasks, such as 
abstract thought and problem solving. Both diaries and personal libraries are 
paradigmatic examples in the history of constitutional protections for personal 
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papers.328 
If we accept that, at the very least, the files we upload to Dropbox may be 
deployed as cognitive artifacts that functionally contribute to the performance of 
cognitive tasks, what does this add to our understanding of Fourth Amendment 
protections for papers? As previously discussed, true freedom of thought 
requires substantial protections for privacy of thought.329 And just as this 
commitment protects the inner workings of the mind, so too must it also ensure 
privacy for all aspects of our cognitive processes. Thus, when papers and their 
digital equivalents are employed as cognitive artifacts—either as aids to our 
cognitive processes or as aspects so integral to those processes as to be 
constitutive of our cognitive systems330—they must be protected from 
unreasonable government interference. The failure to do so frustrates 
autonomous thought, and with it our ability to freely develop new ideas, discover 
new truths, and test our beliefs. Yet that is the state of Fourth Amendment law 
when the third-party doctrine is applied in the new information environment. 
C. Modifications to the Third-Party Doctrine 
In this Part, I propose modifications intended to address the chilling effect 
that “blunt application of the third-party doctrine”331 inflicts on autonomous 
thought. My proposal proceeds from the following six assumptions, drawn from 
the previous discussion: 
1. Freedom of thought is an essential constitutional value grounded 
 primarily but not exclusively in First Amendment doctrine. 
2. Freedom of thought requires privacy of thought, with protections 
 sufficient to safeguard freedom of thought from unreasonable government 
 interference. 
3. The enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of Fourth Amendment 
 protection reflects both the Founders’ commitment to freedom of thought 
 and their appreciation for the important role of personal papers in the 
 development of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. 
4. Modern cognitive science supports the Founders’ intuition as to the 
 importance of papers to our cognitive processes. 
5. Consistent with several models of cognition, papers may function as 
 cognitive artifacts deployed by humans for the purpose of functionally 
 contributing to a cognitive task. 
6. Privacy of thought (as a necessary condition of freedom of thought) 
 requires that papers functioning as cognitive artifacts be protected from 
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 unreasonable government interference. 
One conclusion to draw from these assumptions is that all papers have the 
potential to function as cognitive artifacts; therefore, all papers should be 
categorically excluded from governmental search and seizure. But this would 
merely return us to the absolutist rule of Boyd, which in retrospect seems 
untenable given the glut of digital papers now stored on third-party servers. We 
might alternatively conclude that all papers should be subject to search and 
seizure only with a valid warrant, perhaps subject to one or more of the existing 
exceptions but not to the third-party doctrine. Although certainly a defensible 
position, this undifferentiated approach would seem to prioritize cognitive 
concepts (i.e., papers as cognitive artifacts) without adequate reference to the 
basic constitutional principles those cognitive concepts help to explain. 
My conclusion is a bit more measured. These cognitive concepts provide a 
useful frame for understanding and appreciating the special status afforded 
personal papers, distinct from other forms of property, under English and early 
American law—an appreciation that now seems lost. That is not to say that we 
are compelled, in service of freedom and privacy of thought, to exempt all 
cognitive artifacts from governmental search and seizure. But it does suggest that 
additional protections, guided by historical rationales and illuminated by modern 
cognitive science, may be appropriate. 
In fashioning a limited exemption, I attempt to avoid some of the extreme 
results inherent in prior proposals by neither advocating for a return to near-
absolute protection nor ignoring the special status of papers and the challenges 
of the new information environment.332 At the same time, however, I am mindful 
that the Fourth Amendment often operates best where clear boundaries both 
reflect and guide societal expectations.333 It would be entirely unhelpful, for 
instance, given the mountains of data maintained on cloud-based services, to 
suggest that privacy protections might turn on a case-by-case assessment of the 
content of a particular paper and its role in an individual’s cognitive processes. 
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Indeed, the content of a particular paper is nearly irrelevant to its potential to 
function as a cognitive artifact. Instead, I will attempt to identify a series of 
proxies by which to distinguish a relatively narrow class of digital papers, the 
protection of which is most likely to serve our commitment to freedom of 
thought without unduly burdening society’s interest in effective law 
enforcement. 
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter supports this more 
nuanced approach.334 Recognizing that “seismic shifts in digital technology”335 
have transformed the traditional third-party doctrine into a blunt instrument,336 
Carpenter held that sharing information with a third party may reduce one’s 
expectation of privacy but does not necessarily eliminate it.337 Among the factors 
the Court considered in this more contextual analysis were various features of 
the underlying technology,338 the scope of the surveillance enabled by that 
technology,339 and the nature of the information sought by the government.340 As 
to these first two factors, cloud-computing and communications systems are 
characterized by both the automated, pervasive collection of information and the 
immense capacity to store that information indefinitely—the very characteristics 
that the Carpenter Court found to caution against the uncritical extension of 
Miller and Smith to new technologies.341 
The third factor—the nature of the information sought by the 
government—is the most relevant to my proposal. Having concluded that 
different categories of information may be treated differently under the third-
party doctrine,342 the Court recognized “a world of difference between the 
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller” (i.e., bank 
records and telephone numbers)343 “and the exhaustive chronicle of location 
information” collected in Carpenter.344 Thus, where the information sought by 
the government has the potential to be “sensitive”345 and “revealing” in its 
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“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach,”346 the mere fact that it is revealed to 
or gathered by an automated third-party system “does not make [that 
information] any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”347 This 
approach would seem to except from the third-party doctrine those cloud-
computing and communication systems that collect and store personal papers 
containing our most personal thoughts and private concerns. 
At the same time, focusing on personal papers answers one of the primary 
concerns of the Carpenter dissenters, who criticized the majority for 
“transform[ing] Miller and Smith into an unprincipled and unworkable 
doctrine.”348 The dissenters took issue, in part, with the majority’s failure to 
“explain what makes something a distinct category of information” deserving of 
greater protection.349 But personal papers offer a rare point of general, if not 
entirely clear or unanimous, agreement. Justice Roberts’s five-vote majority 
opinion in Carpenter indicated that the warrant requirement should apply to an 
individual’s digital papers, even when those papers are held by a third party.350 
Dissents by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that Fourth 
Amendment protections should be tethered to the text, acknowledging 
constitutional safeguards for an individual’s “papers.”351 Justice Kennedy went a 
step further, acknowledging that “Miller and Smith may not apply when the 
Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ 
or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are held by a third party.”352 
Justice Gorsuch not only accepted these propositions, but added that complete 
ownership of the relevant papers may not be required to assert a Fourth 
Amendment interest.353 
In the following parts, I describe a subclass of personal papers that, as “a 
distinct category of information,”354 are worthy of enhanced Fourth Amendment 
protection. As I previously argued, personal papers may serve as cognitive 
artifacts, functioning as key components of human cognition. Our constitutional 
commitment to freedom of thought requires privacy of thought and thus privacy 
protections for personal papers that serve this cognitive function. Such 
extraordinary protection is consistent with the intuition of prior generations, who 
wrote their intention to protect personal papers into the text of the Fourth 
Amendment. The following groupings—undisclosed papers, shared confidences, 
and directed transmissions—serve as proxies for identifying a relatively narrow 
band of personal papers that are most likely to serve our commitment to 
freedom of thought without unduly burdening society’s interest in effective law 
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enforcement. 
1. Undisclosed Papers 
A strong claim for an exemption from the third-party doctrine can be made 
for papers held in personal storage that are not intended and are unlikely to be 
directly observed by another party. In Smith, the Supreme Court relied on what 
Matthew Tokson called the “automation rationale” to find that telephone 
numbers dialed by the defendant had been publicly exposed, even where the 
telephone company’s system was entirely automated.355 In reaching this 
conclusion, Tokson posited, the Court determined that “there is no legally 
relevant difference between disclosure of one’s personal information to a third 
party’s automated systems and disclosure to a human being.”356 Like Tokson,357 I 
reject the automation rationale in large part because it perpetuates an all-or-
nothing approach to privacy that, in modern application, undermines basic 
principles and expectations.358 “Virtually every kind of personal online data is 
stored and processed by third-party automated equipment in order to route 
communications, detect spam and viruses, block computer hackers, or generate 
advertising revenue.”359 In this environment, the automation rationale 
“threatens to undermine privacy rights in Internet data and potentially in all new 
communications technologies, present and future.”360 Indeed, the Carpenter 
Court went so far as to suggest that automated information collection cuts in 
favor of Fourth Amendment protections, rather than against, because it creates a 
constant, inescapable stream of data.361 
Tokson’s insight provides one useful proxy by which to identify a workable 
subclass of digital papers to be exempted from application of the third-party 
doctrine. At the core of the historical connection between the Fourth 
Amendment and freedom of thought is the protection for those “papers, such as 
diaries, intended solely for the use and perusal of the author.”362 As the Father 
of Candor wrote about the Wilkes affair, “Any man is at liberty to think, and to 
put what thoughts he pleases upon paper, provided he does not publish them.”363 
Another influential series of pamphlets circulated following Wilkes described 
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personal papers as “our closest confidents.”364 For “personal papers often 
contain an individual’s most private thoughts, never intended to be disclosed to 
anyone else, ‘things that the world never saw and no man has a right to look 
upon.’”365 
As this history makes clear, a more circumscribed reading of the special 
status of personal papers would emphasize the intent of the individual to keep 
his thoughts private—“solely for the use and perusal of the author”366—and thus 
free from government interference. In an automated system where access by a 
human is exceedingly unlikely,367 at least in the absence of a government order 
or request, the user’s intent to keep secret his thoughts from the service provider 
seems both clear and reasonable. In this context, rigid application of the third-
party doctrine and the automation rationale, without regard for the user’s intent 
to disclose, fails to adequately account for even a narrow conception of the role 
that personal papers play in the processes of human thought. Whether personal 
papers are understood as “the private workings of a person’s mind”368 or as 
cognitive artifacts “deployed by human agents for the purpose of functionally 
contributing to performing a cognitive task,”369 the basic values of freedom and 
privacy of thought require at the very least that undisclosed papers remain 
protected from government interference. 
Applying these principles in the cloud-computing environment, the 
strongest claim for exemption from the third-party doctrine would be for the 
personal storage of digital papers maintained by the user of a cloud-based 
service where those papers are not intended and are unlikely to be directly 
observed by another party. A remote possibility that the service itself might 
access the digital paper in its ordinary course of network management would be 
irrelevant, as the intent to maintain privacy through nondisclosure does not 
require perfect concealment.370 Common applications of this exemption would 
include files maintained in remote storage (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, iCloud) 
and photo applications (e.g., Flickr, Photobucket), files replicated in automated 
back-up systems (e.g., Carbonite, iDrive), files created in cloud-based 
applications (e.g., Microsoft Office, Google Docs), and curated files in 
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 368. Dripps, supra note 3, at 66–67 (summarizing the views of Chief Justice Pratt in Entick v. 
Carrington). 
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organization and annotation applications (e.g., Evernote, Scrivener). This 
exemption would also apply to unsent drafts of emails and other forms of 
communication. 
2. Shared Confidences 
A somewhat more nuanced claim for an exemption from the third-party 
doctrine can be made for papers shared within certain discrete groups of 
individuals. Neil Richards has observed that “the development of ideas and 
beliefs” occurs not only in “solitary contemplation” but often in “collaboration 
with a few trusted confidants.”371 Indeed, both Entick and Wilkes, the leading 
English cases on protections for personal papers, involved the collaboration of 
like-minded provocateurs.372 Helen Nissenbaum embraced a similar notion,373 
recognizing that “[i]n some contexts, people expect shared information to be 
held in strict confidence or limited to a small group of confidants.”374 Under the 
third-party doctrine, however, the exposure of information among confidants 
may well vitiate Fourth Amendment protections.375 But this all-or-nothing 
approach “means failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context,” for “it treats exposure to a limited audience as morally 
equivalent to exposure to the whole world.”376 
Tying this back to cognitive science, it may be helpful to introduce the 
collective cognition model—“forms of cognition in which the relevant cognitive 
processes (e.g., reasoning, remembering and problem-solving) are distributed 
across a collection of individuals”377—as well as the closely connected concepts 
of collective memory and transactive memory. Collective memory 
concerns the manner in which information is represented in a group. 
Information may be shared collectively among all of the individuals in 
a group such that each person possesses knowledge in common, or 
alternatively, information may be distributed or divided among 
individuals . . . . [Thus,] group processes may result in shared memories 
that are different from individual memories.378 
 
 371. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 389; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First 
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 372. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1196–204. 
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 374. See Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65 
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Transactive memory may best be thought of as a group strategy for managing 
large amounts of information.379 “Individuals create a division of labor for 
encoding, storing, and retrieving task-relevant information; each individual 
specializes in one or more knowledge domains . . . . [W]hen individuals need 
information in others’ areas of expertise, they can query those experts rather 
than having to invest personally in learning that information.”380 
These are admittedly contentious theories presented—not for the truth of 
the matter but merely to illustrate how collaborative freedom of thought might 
be understood. As an example, one potential consequence of distributing 
cognitive tasks among a group of collaborative individuals is the emergence of 
distinct thoughts and ideas generated from “shared memories that are different 
from individual memories”381—thoughts and ideas beyond those accessible to 
the individual in isolation—and thus distinctly valued. From this perspective, the 
collaborative processes of collective cognition present unique challenges for 
freedom and privacy of thought. Far from intending to maintain secrecy through 
nondisclosure, each individual within the collective intends to share his personal 
papers with the group. Thus, where “the development of ideas and beliefs” 
occurs in “collaboration with a few trusted confidants,”382 protection for 
autonomous thought might well require that we safeguard the processes by 
which “[i]nformation may be shared,”383 including the sharing of personal 
papers. 
The question, of course, is where do we draw the line between protecting 
“collaboration with a few trusted confidants”384 and evisceration of the third-
party doctrine? I suggest two key factors: First, the use of access controls. And 
second, limitations on the number and nature of individuals permitted access. 
Restricted access is a well-developed concept in regard to privacy rights in 
spaces, objects, and communications. One particularly relevant line of cases 
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holds that individuals have a Fourth Amendment interest in password-protected 
and/or encrypted digital files.385 Applying this principle to cloud computing, the 
adequacy of restricted access would turn on the access controls available on a 
particular platform, the default settings for that platform, and affirmative steps 
by the user to limit access. 
But how much access is too much? Apart from the binary default 
requirements of absolute concealment and nondisclosure, the Fourth 
Amendment has little to say regarding the sharing of information among small 
groups of individuals.386 The First Amendment, however, may offer some 
guidance. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,387 the Supreme Court characterized 
the freedom of association as serving, in part, to foster special communities of 
thought388 in which ideals and beliefs are cultivated.389 Recognizing, however, 
that not all communities serve these values, the Court sought to distinguish 
between those communities with strong associational claims and those “lacking 
these qualities.”390 It identified several relevant characteristics, including size, 
purpose, policies, selectivity, and congeniality.391 Relatively small, highly 
selective groups were to be favored, particularly where critical aspects of the 
relationship were secluded from others.392 Given the instrumental connection 
between freedom of thought and freedom of association, these same factors may 
be applied to determine whether the size and nature of a particular collaborative 
group having shared access to cloud-based digital papers serves the 
constitutional values of autonomous thought. 
3. Directed Transmissions 
Finally, the strongest claim for an exemption from the third-party doctrine 
can be made for email and other forms of directed electronic communication, the 
status of which remains unsettled. As a subset of shared confidences, privacy 
protections for directed transmissions—communications directed to a particular 
person, generally to the exclusion of others—remain uniquely valued as a matter 
of law and tightly bound to their constitutional pedigree. In Ex parte Jackson, the 
Supreme Court held that “[l]etters and sealed packages . . . are as fully guarded 
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from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as 
if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”393 
Referencing the Fourth Amendment explicitly, the Court declared: 
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in 
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to 
their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be . . . . 
[T]hey can only be opened and examined under like warrant . . . as is 
required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own 
household.394 
This remains the law today, more than 140 years after it was decided.395 
What of email and other forms of directed electronic communication, in 
which third-party intermediaries and online service providers process and store 
the information? Absent a recognized exception to the third-party doctrine, 
email would seem to constitute information exposed to the public (i.e., to a third-
party intermediary analogous to the telephone company in Smith).396 
Nevertheless, it is usually presented as settled law that Jackson applies equally to 
email.397 
First, for government officials to access the contents of e-mails or other 
electronic communications, they must obtain a warrant based upon 
probable cause absent a warrant exception. Second, if the government 
seeks non-content information such as subscriber information, the 
to/from line on an e-mail, or the IP addresses of websites visited, a 
subpoena will generally suffice.398 
Officials of the U.S. Department of Justice have publicly stated that the 
department accepts this content/non-content distinction.399 But others push back 
on this assertion. At a recent public event, Jennifer Lynch of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation reported that government litigators had in certain cases 
sought to “undermine . . . settled law, or what we thought was settled law” 
regarding Fourth Amendment protections for the content of email.400 Fellow 
panelist Laura Donohue echoed this assessment.401 It is worth noting that the 
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the matter and the lower courts are more 
divided on the question than many have suggested.402 
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If we accept that the principle of nondisclosure may, in certain contexts, 
survive sharply limited publication, then application of Jackson to email is 
consistent with both the collective cognition model and the historical rationale 
for safeguarding private papers.403 Other forms of direct messaging using similar 
access controls (e.g., encryption, password protection) merit the same protection, 
even where the somewhat tortured analogy to regular mail is more difficult to 
maintain. These include direct messaging via such services as Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram, and iMessage. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have endeavored to do three things. First, I have attempted 
to show that our constitutional commitment to freedom of thought is historically 
and properly connected to the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of 
Fourth Amendment protection. Second, I have sought to revive the connection 
between freedom of thought and personal papers by reference to modern models 
of human cognition, explaining how papers serve as cognitive artifacts 
functioning within a cognitive system and performing cognitive tasks. Third, I 
have proposed changes to the third-party doctrine that are intended to safeguard 
a relatively narrow class of digital papers, the protection of which is most likely 
to serve our commitment to freedom of thought. 
As an ever-greater proportion of our transactions and interactions take 
place online, generating enormous amounts of data to be processed and stored 
by intermediaries and service providers, we must decide how legal doctrine built 
around desks, closets, and file cabinets should be adapted to always-on 
connectivity and cloud-computing networks. Although many have identified and 
sought to rectify the privacy problems created by this shift, it has proven difficult 
to articulate a limitation to the third-party doctrine that is both consistent with 
existing principles and feasible in practice. 
This Article represents a new approach to that difficult problem. Historical 
understanding is supported with insight from contemporary cognitive science, 
translating the intuition of prior generations into current cognitive theory. These 
principles are then adapted into a set of proxy characteristics that distinguish 
those personal papers most likely to serve our constitutional values. The 
resulting approach provides a coherent and workable method for limiting the 
reach of the third-party doctrine and returning equilibrium to information 
privacy. 
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